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OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
This is a dispute over prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees.  The plaintiffs, two 
individuals and two pharmacies, brought a denial of benefits suit under the Employee 
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Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., and two 
state law causes of action.  The defendants are insurance companies.  The District Court 
ordered the parties to engage in a dispute resolution process, which resulted in approval 
of all of the plaintiffs’ claims for recovery of benefits.  These consolidated appeals 
concern the District Court’s decisions (1) to dismiss a claim under Pennsylvania law as 
lacking a private right of action, (2) to dismiss the remaining claims as moot without 
considering plaintiffs’ request for interest on recovered benefits, and (3) not to award 
either party attorneys’ fees and costs.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
District Court’s rulings on attorneys’ fees and its dismissal of the Pennsylvania law 
claim.  We will vacate and remand with regard to the District Court’s rulings on 
mootness.   
I. 
We write solely for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  Plaintiffs Christopher Templin and Viola Hendricks are employees of Factor 
Health Services II, LLC.  Factor Health Services is a subsidiary of FCS Pharmacy, LLC 
(“FCS”), a Florida-based pharmacy wholesaler.  Templin and Hendricks participate in an 
ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan offered by Factor Health Services.  The 
plan guarantees them coverage for certain medications that manage hemophilia, a 
dangerous blood disorder.  Defendant QCC Insurance Company (“QCC”) issued the plan 
to Factor Health Services.  QCC is a subsidiary of defendant Independence Blue Cross 
(together, we refer to them as the “IBC defendants”), a Pennsylvania insurance company 
and a licensee of BlueCross BlueShield Association.  The third defendant, CareFirst, Inc., 
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also is a licensee of BlueCross BlueShield, but operates in Maryland.  CareFirst did not 
provide the plaintiffs insurance or play any role in funding their benefit plan.  
Since December 2007, Templin and Hendricks have obtained hemophilia 
medication from plaintiffs FCS and Feldman’s Medical Center Pharmacy, Inc. 
(“Feldman’s”), both specialty pharmacies.  They set up a relationship whereby they 
agreed to assign to the pharmacies the right to file claims for reimbursement directly with 
the IBC defendants and CareFirst.  This dispute arose after the pharmacies dispensed 
medication to Templin and Hendricks and submitted claims to the defendants, some of 
which were not paid in a timely manner.   
Alleging wrongful denial of benefits, the plaintiffs filed an initial complaint in 
September 2009 and a first amended complaint in December 2009.  The defendants 
moved to dismiss on the basis that the plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative 
remedies.  Rather than dismiss the case, the District Court ordered the parties to engage 
in the dispute resolution process detailed in the plan.  As a result of that process, the 
defendants approved payment for all the plaintiffs’ claims.  Before the defendants were 
able to pay the claims in full, however, the plaintiffs filed a four-count Second Amended 
Complaint.  They asserted two claims under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(1)(B) (Counts 1 and 2), a claim against the IBC defendants under the 
Pennsylvania Quality Health Care Accountability and Protection Act (hereinafter Health 
Care Act), 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 991.2166 (Count 3), and a claim against CareFirst 
under Md. Code. Ann., Ins. § 15-1005 (Count 4).  The prayer for relief requested 
payment of claims, declaratory relief, interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. 
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The IBC defendants filed a renewed motion to dismiss.  The District Court granted 
the motion with respect to Count 3, reasoning that § 991.2166 of the Health Care Act did 
not create a private right of action.  On the remaining claims, the court reserved judgment 
and directed the parties to participate in mediation on the issues of interest, attorneys’ 
fees, and costs.  When that process proved unsuccessful, the District Court ordered 
dismissal on the merits of the remaining claims against the defendants. The plaintiffs’ 
claims for recovery of benefits, reasoned the court, became moot when the defendants 
approved and paid the claims in full.
1
  Recognizing that the issues of attorneys’ fees and 
costs remained unresolved, the District Court indicated that it would entertain any 
motions requesting such relief after the entry of final judgment.  It did not address 
whether the plaintiffs’ demand for interest would be resolved in post-judgment motion 
practice.  The plaintiffs timely appealed the order of dismissal.   
The IBC defendants filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs on May 27, 2011, 
fourteen days after the entry of final judgment.  The plaintiffs filed a motion for 
attorneys’ fees and costs on June 13, thirty-one days after the entry of final judgment.  
This prompted the IBC defendants to move to strike the plaintiffs’ motion as untimely.  
The District Court agreed that the plaintiffs’ motion was filed after the filing period set 
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) and found no good cause for extending the 
filing window.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B).  Moreover, the District Court explained, it 
                                              
1
 CareFirst did not file a separate motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.  
But, understanding that mootness is a jurisdictional issue, see Harrow v. Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am., 279 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 2002), the District Court ordered dismissal of the 
claims for recovery of benefits asserted against CareFirst because, it believed, those 
claims also became moot once CareFirst paid the plaintiffs’ claims in full.     
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would not award the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees even if their motion was timely because 
they did not achieve “some degree of success on the merits,” Hardt v. Reliance Standard 
Life Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2158 (2010), and did not convince the court to 
exercise its discretion to award fees.   
The District Court also denied the IBC defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees.  
Most rulings made in IBC defendants’ favor throughout the litigation, the court 
explained, were procedural and did not constitute “some degree of success on the merits,” 
id. at 2158, but dismissal of Count 3 was some measure of success on the merits.  After 
considering relevant discretionary factors, however, the District Court declined to award 
the IBC defendants counsel fees and costs.
2
  The plaintiffs appealed the grant of the 
motion to strike and the denial of their motion for attorneys’ fees, while the IBC 
defendants cross appealed.  The appeals have been consolidated and are before us now.
3
 
II. 
The plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred by (1) dismissing the Health Care 
Act claim on the basis that the Act does not create a private right of action; (2) granting 
the IBC defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on mootness 
grounds when demand for prejudgment interest remained to be adjudicated; and (3) 
rejecting their motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.  The IBC defendants’ cross appeal 
likewise challenges the denial of their motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. 
 
                                              
2
 CareFirst did not seek attorneys’ fees and costs. 
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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A.  
The plaintiffs first contest the District Court’s dismissal of Count 3, the claim for 
relief under § 991.2166 of the Health Care Act.
4
  The District Court dismissed the claim 
on the basis that § 991.2166 creates no private right of action.
5
  It is common ground 
amongst the parties that the statute does not contain an express right of action.  But it was 
error, the plaintiffs contend, for the District Court not to recognize in the statute an 
implicit right to sue.  
In determining whether § 991.2166 contains an implicit private right of action, we 
are not without guidance.  In Solomon v. United States Healthcare Systems of 
Pennsylvania, Inc., the Pennsylvania Superior Court applied Pennsylvania’s three-part 
test to determine if the legislature intended to extend to health care providers a right to 
sue.  797 A.2d 346, 352-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
6
  Health care providers, the court 
reasoned, fall within the class of individuals for whose benefit the statute was enacted.  
Id.  However, the legislative history disclosed no intent to create a civil court 
enforcement remedy for health care providers or for any other private party.  Id. at 353.  
                                              
4
 Section 991.2166 requires insurers and managed care plans to pay “clean claims” 
submitted by health care providers within 45 days of receipt of the claim and sets an 
interest rate penalty for failure to pay in that time frame.  40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
991.2166.  
5
 “We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss the complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”  Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. 
BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 2010). 
6
 To determine if there is an implied right of action in a statute, Pennsylvania courts 
examine whether (1) the plaintiff is “one of the class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted,” (2) the legislative history reveals intent to create or deny a right of 
action, and (3) a right of action is consistent with the purpose of the legislative scheme.  
Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623, 626 (Pa. 1999).   
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To the contrary, the administrative procedures established by the implementing 
regulations indicated that no private right of action exists.  Id.  Entrusting state agencies 
with overseeing a dispute resolution mechanism, the regulations anticipate expeditious 
claim resolution in an administrative forum.  Id. (citing 31 Pa. Code § 154.18).  But a 
civil right of action would stymie those administrative processes and undercut the 
purpose of the legislative scheme.  Id.  Accordingly, the court concluded, § 991.2166 of 
the Health Care Act does not create a private right of action.  Id. at 352-53. 
The plaintiffs urge us to reject Solomon in favor of an unreported District Court 
decision that unearths in § 991.2166 a cause of action.  We decline the invitation to 
subvert a state court’s interpretation of its statute to that of a federal court.  Mindful of the 
proper division of authority between state and federal courts, we defer to a state appellate 
court’s interpretation of its own state’s statute absent convincing evidence that the state 
supreme court would construe the statute differently.  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2000); Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 126 
F.3d 524, 528 n.3 (3d Cir. 1997).  The plaintiffs do not argue that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would part ways with Solomon.  Nor have they offered a persuasive basis 
for departing from Solomon’s reasoning.  Their citations to decisions from other states’ 
courts and journal articles carry little weight in the face of a Pennsylvania court’s 
construction of a Pennsylvania statute.  We therefore will affirm the dismissal of Count 3 
on the basis that that the prompt payment provision contains no implied right of action. 
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B. 
The plaintiffs next object to the District Court’s dismissal of the Second Amended 
Complaint as moot without considering their request for prejudgment interest.
7
  They do 
not dispute that the plea for benefits became moot once the defendants paid in full, but 
they maintain that it was premature to dismiss the claims before addressing their 
entitlement to interest on the benefits.
8
  Wishing to bypass the question whether the 
claims were moot irrespective of plaintiffs’ lingering demand for interest, the defendants 
argue that the plaintiffs were never eligible for interest in the first place. 
Claims become moot when circumstances evolve to destroy their justiciability.  
Federal courts lack power to review moot claims because our jurisdiction depends on the 
presence of a case or controversy.  SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 
407 (1972); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 340 (3d Cir. 2004).  It is well 
settled that “[w]here one of the several issues presented becomes moot, the remaining 
live issues supply the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy.”  Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 497 (1969).  However, “[a]n offer of complete relief will 
generally moot the plaintiff’s claim, as at that point the plaintiff retains no personal 
interest in the outcome of the litigation.”  Weiss, 385 F.3d at 340.   
This case poses the question whether payment of withheld benefits constitutes 
complete relief and thereby moots the case, or whether the plaintiffs’ unresolved demand 
                                              
7
 We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on the basis of mootness de 
novo.  OSHA Data/CIH, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000). 
8
 The plaintiffs do not argue that their entitlement to interest derives from the plan’s 
terms.  They contend only that they were denied the opportunity to ask the District Court 
to award them interest.  
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for interest on the withheld benefits preserves their personal stake in litigation.  The 
District Court treated the plaintiffs’ interest in the case as resolved once the defendants 
refunded the benefits claims in full.  Its opinion acknowledged the plaintiffs’ request for 
attorneys’ fees and costs, but made no mention of their plea for interest.  The omission is 
conspicuous, for the District Court had, in an earlier hearing, identified the issues 
remaining in the case after payment of benefits as “interest, costs and attorneys’ fees,” 
and then ordered mediation on those issues.  E.g., App. 885:8.   
Dismissal of the claims as moot without considering the plaintiffs’ entitlement to 
interest was error.  Voluntary payment of withheld benefits after initiation of a lawsuit 
does not necessarily moot the plaintiffs’ claims, since they have requested interest in their 
complaint.  See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 57 
(1st Cir. 1999) (holding that claims were not mooted when Rhode Island refunded 
wrongfully withheld pension benefits because the plan beneficiaries had demanded 
interest owed under the plan for the period during which payments were not made); 
Tucson Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 971, 978-79 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s claims for withheld Medicare benefits did not become moot when the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services settled the principal reimbursement claims 
because claims for interest had not been resolved); 13C C. Wright, A. Miller & E. 
Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3533.3, at 15-16 (3d ed. 2008) (“[M]ootness is 
avoided by demands for back pay, medical monitoring . . . , public benefits, and interest.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained, “[T]he 
possibility of even a partial remedy is sufficient to prevent a case from being moot.”  
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Parella, 173 F.3d at 57 (citing Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (per 
curiam)). 
The next question is whether the plaintiffs were eligible for interest on the 
benefits.  The IBC defendants and CareFirst urge us to uphold dismissal of the Second 
Amended Complaint on the basis that the plaintiffs cannot recover interest on their claims 
under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) or Maryland law.  ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) provides a cause 
of action to a participant or beneficiary of a plan “to recover benefits due to him under 
the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his 
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  The 
defendants declare that a different provision of ERISA, § 502(a)(3),
9
 is the only 
mechanism for recovery of interest on delayed benefits paid voluntarily, while the 
plaintiffs insist that § 502(a)(1)(B) can afford the same relief.   
Aside from these conclusory assertions, neither party endeavors to explain 
whether § 502(a)(1)(B) is best interpreted to permit or preclude interest.  Because the 
parties offer no argument on the proper statutory construction of § 502(a)(1)(B), and 
because the District Court never considered the issue, we will vacate the grant of the 
motion to dismiss and remand for consideration of whether § 502(a)(1)(B) provides an 
independent claim for interest, regardless of whether any benefits due under the plan have 
                                              
9
 ERISA § 502(a)(3) provides a cause of action to a “participant, beneficiary, or 
fiduciary” of an ERISA plan “to obtain . . . appropriate equitable relief . . . to redress . . . 
violations” of the plan.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).   
  
12 
been paid.
10
  If so, the plaintiffs’ § 502(a)(1)(B) claims are not moot because the 
plaintiffs could yet secure a judgment awarding interest based on that statute.  If § 
502(a)(1)(B) does not provide an independent basis for a judgment awarding interest, 
then the plaintiffs’ claims are moot because they have already received the only relief 
available to them and they have no live claim left that would entitle them to a judgment 
and hence to a discretionary award of prejudgment interest.  Cf. Rumber v. District of 
Columbia, 595 F.3d 1298, 1300 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining that a complaint’s 
request for monetary relief did not maintain a live controversy where there was “no basis 
on which [the plaintiffs could] collect damages”). 
For the same reasons, we will vacate the dismissal of the claim against CareFirst 
under Md. Code. Ann., Ins. § 15-1005.  The District Court did not address the plaintiffs’ 
request for interest under § 15-1005, reasoning only that “[t]he case became moot when 
                                              
10
 We reasoned in Fotta v. Trustees of United Mine Workers of America that “[t]he 
principles justifying prejudgment interest also justify an award of interest where benefits 
are delayed but paid without the beneficiary’s having obtained a judgment.”  165 F.3d 
209, 212 (3d Cir. 1998).  A “late payment of benefits,” whether by means of a judgment 
or administrative process, “effectively deprives the beneficiary of the time value of his or 
her money.”  Id.  The appropriate vehicle for obtaining interest on benefits recovered 
without a judgment but after considerable delay, we determined, is ERISA § 502(a)(3).  
Id. at 213.  Nevertheless, we declined to decide whether § 502(a)(1)(B) permits an award 
of interest after recovery of withheld benefits but absent a judgment in the beneficiary’s 
favor.  Id. at 213 n.1; see also Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 209 
(3d Cir. 2004).  Several of our sister Courts of Appeals, however, find no implied cause 
of action in § 502(a)(1)(B) for a claim of interest unless the plan expressly provides for 
such relief.  See, e.g., Flint v. ABB, Inc., 337 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003); Clair v. 
Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 1999).  Because the plaintiffs may 
still be able to assert a claim for interest under § 502(a)(3), the question whether § 
502(a)(1)(B) provides an independent basis for relief could itself become moot if the 
District Court permits the plaintiffs to amend the complaint to assert a claim under § 
502(a)(3) or if the plaintiffs choose to file a new complaint for interest under that 
statutory provision. 
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Defendant Carefirst paid the claims.”  App. 25.  As discussed, this was not necessarily 
correct.  And because the § 15-1005 claim was not necessarily moot, the District Court 
should not have dismissed the claim sua sponte without considering the plaintiffs’ 
entitlement to interest on the benefits recovered from CareFirst under that statute.  
CareFirst raises a number of arguments as to why the plaintiffs are ineligible for interest 
under § 15-1005, namely that the provision may not contain a private right of action, may 
not apply at all to the plaintiffs’ claims, and may be preempted by ERISA.  It did not 
raise these arguments in a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, and we 
will permit the District Court to consider them in the first instance.
11
 
C. 
Both the plaintiffs and the IBC defendants challenge the District Court’s denial of 
their motions for attorneys’ fees and costs.12  The District Court granted the IBC 
defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees on the basis that it 
was untimely.  Final judgment was entered on May 13, 2011, and the plaintiffs filed their 
motion a month later, on June 13, 2011.  Rule 54(d)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires a motion for attorneys’ fees to be filed “no later than 14 days after the 
entry of judgment” unless a statute or court order provides otherwise.  Rule 6(b) excuses 
                                              
11
 CareFirst also challenges the timeliness of the plaintiffs’ post-judgment effort to obtain 
interest.  Because the plaintiffs’ claims for interest were not necessarily moot, we need 
not consider whether they were required to seek interest in post-judgment motion 
practice. 
12
 We review a district court’s award or denial of attorneys’ fees under ERISA for abuse 
of discretion.  Ellison v. Shenango Inc. Pension Bd., 956 F.2d 1268, 1273 (3d Cir. 1992).  
In so doing, we review its legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear 
error.  Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. All Shore, Inc., 514 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2008).  
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noncompliance only when a party requests an extension of time before the original 
deadline or upon a showing of excusable neglect.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). 
There is no dispute that the plaintiffs filed their motion well past the 14-day filing 
deadline set by Rule 54(d)(2) and that they did not request an extension of time.  The 
plaintiffs ask this Court to excuse their failure to abide by the rule because, they say, their 
mistake did not prejudice the defendants.  Whether or not an untimely motion for 
attorneys’ fees prejudices the opposing party is beside the point, for Rule 54(d)(2), read 
in conjunction with Rule 6(b)(1), permits an award of fees on an untimely motion only 
after a finding of excusable neglect.  See Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 785 (3d Cir. 
2010).  The plaintiffs do not maintain that their noncompliance with the rule was caused 
by excusable neglect, so we will affirm the District Court’s conclusion that their motion 
for attorneys’ fees was untimely.  See Bender v. Freed, 436 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(affirming denial of ERISA attorneys’ fees as untimely when the moving party had no 
good reason for missing Rule 54(d)(2)’s deadline).   
In the cross appeal, the IBC defendants maintain that it was error not to award 
them attorneys’ fees.  The District Court found that they achieved some measure of 
success in the case by prevailing on their motion to dismiss Count 3.  It then balanced the 
discretionary policy factors announced in Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673 
(3d Cir. 1983), and found that those factors did not favor an award.  The IBC defendants 
urge us to uphold the District Court’s threshold ruling, but to conclude that the court 
abused its discretion in weighing the Ursic factors. 
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ERISA provides that a district court “in its discretion may allow a reasonable 
attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.”  29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).  The Supreme 
Court understands this provision to permit a fee award for either party in an ERISA 
action, so long as that party achieved “some degree of success on the merits.”  Hardt, 130 
S. Ct. at 2158.  This standard, the Court has cautioned, is not met by a showing of “trivial 
success on the merits” or a “purely procedural victor[y].”  Id.  We agree with the District 
Court that the IBC defendants satisfied the “some degree of success on the merits” 
inquiry by showing, at a minimum, that they prevailed in securing dismissal of Count 3.  
That ruling was a rejection of a portion of the plaintiffs’ request for relief on the merits, 
and as such cannot be characterized as a mere procedural victory.  
Turning to the policy factors, our precedent directs district courts to consider “(1) 
the offending parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the offending parties to 
satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees; (3) the deter[r]ent effect of an award of attorneys’ 
fees against the offending parties; (4) the benefit conferred on members of the pension 
plan as a whole; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ position[s]” before deciding 
whether to award fees and costs.  Ursic, 719 F.2d at 673.  The factors “are not 
requirements in the sense that a party must demonstrate all of them in order to warrant an 
award of attorney’s fees, but rather they are elements a court must consider in exercising 
its discretion.”  Fields v. Thompson Printing Co., 363 F.3d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 2004). 
The District Court thoughtfully addressed four of the five factors (the fourth factor 
was inapplicable) in rejecting the IBC defendants’ application for counsel fees.  It found 
that the first factor did not favor an award because the record did not suggest that the 
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plaintiffs filed suit in bad faith.  The second factor likewise disfavored an award because, 
based on allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs likely would be 
unable to satisfy an award.  With respect to the third factor, the court found that an award 
would deter plaintiffs from filing suit before exhausting administrative remedies, but also 
reasoned that it would thwart the ERISA policy of encouraging insurance companies to 
pay claims in a timely fashion.  On the question of the relative merits of the parties’ 
positions, the District Court found that the IBC defendants achieved a measure of success 
on the merits, but the plaintiffs obtained the more substantive victory of full payment of 
claims.  
We conclude that the District Court’s consideration of the Ursic factors furnishes a 
reasoned basis for denying the IBC defendants attorneys’ fees and costs.  The IBC 
defendants, however, insist that the plaintiffs are culpable for filing suit before exhausting 
administrative remedies.  But notwithstanding their noncompliance with the plan’s 
dispute resolution procedures, the plaintiffs tried, unsuccessfully, to resolve their claims 
with QCC and Independence before filing suit.  The IBC defendants next fault the 
District Court for performing insufficient factfinding on the plaintiffs’ ability to satisfy an 
award of counsel fees.  Although the court did not conduct additional factfinding, the IBC 
defendants bore the burden of establishing the factual predicate for their application for 
attorneys’ fees, and they did not proffer evidence of plaintiffs’ ability to satisfy an award.  
The IBC defendants next object to the District Court’s consideration of the deterrent 
effect of declining to award them fees because they, unlike the plaintiffs, were not 
“offending parties.”  Ursic, 719 F.2d at 673.  The District Court correctly determined that 
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the plaintiffs and the defendants shared responsibility for litigation:  the IBC defendants 
delayed approval of plaintiffs’ claims for years without explanation, while the plaintiffs 
did not comply with administrative procedures before filing suit.  Finally, the IBC 
defendants maintain that the merits of their position outweighs that of the plaintiffs.  We 
disagree.  As the District Court found, the plaintiffs prevailed on the core issue in the case 
— that is, their entitlement to benefits.  The IBC defendants, we conclude, fall short of 
establishing that the District Court abused its discretion.   
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court 
ordering dismissal of Count 3 and denying both parties attorneys’ fees.  We will vacate 
the order dismissing Counts 1, 2, and 4 as moot and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
